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The State of American Federalism, 2002-
2003: Division Replaces Unity 
Dale Krane 
University of Nebraska at Omaha 
The national unity formed last year in response to terrorism soon vanished as more typical political 
infighting returned. Although overshadowed by the buildup to and the conduct of a second war against 
Iraq, political issues grounded in the nation's federal character contributed to a rise in divisiveness. The 
mid-term elections of 2002 and redistricting battles in several states drove partisanship to new heights. 
The continued sluggishness of the nations economy also exacerbated interparty bickering. Republicans 
controlled the White House and both houses of Congress, yet some of the president's policy initiatives 
encountered more serious resistance in his own party than from the opposition. Many of the feuds within 
the majority party rested on state and regional interests typical of federalism politics. State and local 
governments remained trapped in the third year of a fiscal crisis, and even large reductions in expenditures 
did not extricate these governments from the financial fix. Despite their pleas, state and local officials 
were unable to obtain any significant relief from the federal government. Federal-state relations, as a 
consequence, exhibited more contentiousness than cooperation. 
The war in Iraq and the attempts to revive the economy eclipsed but 
did not eliminate federalism issues from the nation's political life. 
Implementation of homeland-security measures engaged officials of all 
governments, and these officials played familiar intergovernmental "games" 
in pursuit of jurisdictional interests. National policy battles exhibited 
unanticipated partisan and geographic combinations as the president 
encountered serious resistance not only from the opposing party but also 
from diverse factions within his party. The U.S. Supreme Court's "Federalism 
Five" did not do much to advance their state-friendly federalism 
jurisprudence, but the Court did agree to hear several cases that may offer 
opportunities to advance their agenda. State governments continued to be 
constrained by the long-running fiscal crisis, and local governments paid 
part of the price as states reduced intergovernmental transfers. The fiscal 
crunch notwithstanding, state governments produced a remarkable array 
of policy initiatives. Two of the nation's most populous states-California 
and Texas-served as arenas for bitter political battles that had spillover effects 
on the rest of the nation. 
Once the Taliban were driven from power in Afghanistan, President 
George Bush's administration turned its attention to other nations believed 
to be engaged in terrorist activities; in the process, Bush labeled Iraq, Iran, 
and North Korea an "axis of evil." With the president's popularity soaring 
with the success of military operations in Afghanistan, the White House 
initiated a full-court press of criticism against Saddam Hussein and Iraq. 
The administration's case that Iraq posed an imminent threat to the United 
© Publius: The journal of Federalism 33:3 (Summer 2003) 
1 
States rested on the twin claims that Iraq possessed weapons of mass 
destruction and had links to Al-Qaeda. Congress in early October 2002 
agreed with the president's assessment and passed a resolution authorizing 
the use of force if necessary to disarm Saddam Hussein. 1 
The struggle for advantage in the November 2002 congressional elections 
turned into a partisan debate over "guns versus butter." Republican 
candidates stressed the war against terrorism, but the public's principal 
worries turned out to be jobs and the economy. The Democrats tried to 
exploit these concerns as well as those over corporate malfeasance and health 
care. The November election would be crucial because Congress was closely 
divided, and a shift in partisan alignment could set the stage for major 
changes in the course of public policy. 2 President Bush, in a risky and 
unusual tactic, spent three weeks in October traveling around the country 
urging voters to support his party's candidates. Bush's aggressive 
campaigning paid dividends. The Republicans added six seats to their slim 
majority in the U.S. House of Representatives and managed to recapture a 
thin 51-49 majority in the U.S. Senate. The results ran counter to the usual 
historical pattern of losses in mid-term elections by the party in control of 
the White House, and thus provided the president with an important 
political victory. 
Two unexpected changes in party leadership made the transition to the 
1 08'h Congress noteworthy. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) made 
controversial comments about segregation at a centennial birthday party 
for Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC). Despite his best efforts to downplay 
and later apologize for his gaffe, southern senators refused to forgive him 
and Lott was forced to resign his leadership post. Senator William Frist (R-
TN) emerged out of the caucus as the new majority leader. Over in the 
House of Representatives, the Democrats had to choose a new minority 
leader when Representative Richard Gephardt (D-MO) resigned. The 
ensuing intraparty struggle culminated in the selection of Representative 
Nancy Pelosi (D-CA). Pelosi, a senior member of the House Appropriations 
Committee, is the first woman to lead a party in Congress. 
Through winter, the White House sharpened its criticism of Hussein and 
produced a portfolio of information to demonstrate the validity of the 
president's claims; however, its indictment oflraq encountered considerable 
opposition and skepticism at home and abroad. Despite a concerted 
diplomatic effort to persuade other nations, including a major briefing at 
the United Nations by Secretary of State Colin Powell, key allies such as 
France and Germany resisted following Bush's lead. On 17 March 2003, 
the president declared Iraq to be in "material breach" of U. N. Security 
Council resolutions requiring it to disarm, and Bush warned Hussein and 
'The White House, "President: Iraqi Regime Danger to America is 'Grave and Growing'," press release, 
5 October 2002 (www.whitehouse.gov). 
'Howard Fineman, "Iraq Around the Clock," Newsweek,l6 September 2002, pp. 35-36. 
his sons they must leave Iraq in 48 hours or military conflict would begin.3 
Two days later, Bush announced to the nation that the United States had 
attacked Iraq.4 Combat operations by U. S. and British armed forces in 
Iraq were surprisingly quick and successful. The president, in a speech 
from the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln, declared the end of major 
combat activity on 1 May 2003.5 The rapid rout of Iraqi military forces, 
however, did not end the hostilities. Survivors of the old regime mounted 
a rear-guard, guerrilla style resistance that slowly escalated into daily attacks 
on the occupying forces. By early summer 2003, the disorderly environment 
in Iraq became a major political issue in the opening phase of the 2004 
presidential contest. 
The economy's deterioration still bedeviled the Bush administration. 
Unemployment reached a nine-year high, wages fell, and businesses cut 
costs. The administration had gained passage of tax cuts two years in a row, 
let the dollar decline against other currencies, and increased federal 
spending. The Federal Reserve, fearing deflation, lowered interest rates to 
a 45-year low. Yet the economy remained stagnant, except for the housing 
market, which was sustained by the low interest rates. Working against the 
national government's stimulative efforts were several factors, including the 
multi-year fiscal crisis faced by state governments, the concomitant reduction 
in state and local government spending, a falling stock market, and the 
outsourcing of jobs to overseas locations.6 Not only were manufacturing 
jobs being exported overseas, so were service jobs. Several state governments, 
following the example set by the private sector, hired firms located in India 
to answer toll-free assistance lines to respond to state residents seeking 
unemployment and welfare benefits.7 By early summer, a turnaround in 
the stock market and a rise in business spending raised hopes that the 
economy would improve more substantially, given that the recession had 
actually ended in November 2001. 
New cases of corporate scandals emerged, and their persistence dragged 
on economic growth. Several financial and business consulting firms had 
assisted Enron and other large corporations by guiding the companies 
through complex financial schemes to avoid taxes. Some of the maneuvers 
included the establishment of hundreds of off-shore subsidiaries, 
manipulation of information contained in corporate accounting reports, 
and the creative use of tax shelters. As a result, corporate profits reported 
'The White House, "Global Message," press release, 17 March 2003 (www.whitehouse.gov). 
'The White House, "President Addresses The Nation," press release, 19 March 2003 
(www.whitehouse.gov). 
'The White House, "President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations In Iraq Have Ended," 
press release, I May 2003 (www.whitehouse.gov). 
6AIIan Sloan, "Bush's Depressing Economy," Newsweek, I 0 Febmrary 2003, pp. 56-58; David Leonhardt, 
"A Sickly Economy, With No Cure in Sight," New York Times, 25 May 2003 (Netscape version); David 
Leonhardt, "'Egalitarian Recession' Keeps Anger at Bay," New York Times, I5June 2003 (Netscape version). 
'Amy Waldman, "More 'Can I Help You?' Jobs Migrate From U.S. to India," Nro1 York Times, I I May 
2003 (Netscape version). 
to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) were $155 billion less than those 
reported to shareholders.8 Another set of cases focused on securities brokers 
who employed fraudulent practices, such as recommending the purchase 
of 'junk" stocks to clients and giving favored clients preferences in initial 
public stock offerings. The Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) 
failure to police brokerage houses and a crackdown by the attorney general 
of New York provoked a clash between federal and state government 
regulators. Wall Street firms rushed to Congress to prevent New York and 
other states from imposing disclosure, conflict-of-interest, and other 
reporting requirements that differed from those mandated by the SEC. 
Passage of this type of legislation would effectively undercut a state's ability 
to investigate securities fraud. For its part, the SEC supported restrictions 
on state government jurisdiction over brokerage activities.9 
One might have expected the two political parties to work together to 
address the twin challenges of war and the economy, especially with the 
narrowness of the Republican majority in both congressional chambers. 
But the opposite occurred; throughout the year, partisanship became more 
extreme, not just in Washington, but across the nation. An effort to pass a 
new redistricting plan in Texas provided the most visible and visceral 
example of this unrestrained partisanship. Conceived by U. S. House 
Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-TX), the proposed plan would significantly 
decrease the number of congressional seats likely to be won by Democrats.10 
The Republicans controlled the governorship and the legislature, and 
expected the plan to be approved quickly. In a desperate gambit, the 
Democratic minority in the state house fled to Oklahoma in an effort to 
stymie any vote in May. When Governor Rick Perry tried once again in 
June to pass the redistricting plan, Senate Democrats hid out in New Mexico. 
A similar redistricting battle, but with less drama, occurred in Colorado. 
Democrats threatened to retaliate by redrawing congressional lines in New 
Mexico and Oklahoma, where they controlled state government. The level 
of partisan rancor rose to new heights because these redistricting battles 
would have huge consequences for the 2004 congressional elections. But 
the bitterness was also exacerbated by the novelty of the intrusion of a 
national political figure into state political matters. '"This is a political 
strategy we haven't seen before,' said Tom Storey, redistricting analyst for 
the National Conference of State Legislatures. 'People who study this area 
can't find a case in the last 100 years of mid-decade redistricting without a 
court order' ."11 In less than two years, the nation's political climate changed 
'David Cay Johnson, "Tax Moves by Enron Said to Mystify I.R.S.," New York Times, 13 February 2003 
(Netscape version). 
'Brooke A. Masters, "States' Role in Doubt on Wall Street," New York Times, 23 July 2003 (Netscape 
version). 
10R.G. Ratcliffe and Clay Robinson, "New battle brews over redistricting," Houston Chronicle, 19 June 
2003, pp. 1 and 14A. 
"Quoted in T. R. Reid, "GOP Redistricting: New Boundaries of Politics?" N= York Times, 2 July 2003 
(Netscape version). 
from the unity immediately following the 9/11 attack to a new low in 
divisiveness. 
HOMELAND SECURITY 
In the months following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, all 
governments initiated numerous actions designed to prevent future attacks 
as well as to upgrade the nation's ability to manage the consequences of 
any future incident. Governor Tom Ridge was sworn in as the first Secretary 
of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on 24January 2003, and 
the Department assumed responsibility for the nation's security on 1 March 
2003. The DHS immediately launched several initiatives, notably the Ready 
Campaign, a citizen-preparedness movement designed to educate citizens 
about basic survival equipment, supplies, and tools as well as appropriate 
responses to possible attacks; Operation Liberty Shield, a comprehensive 
national plan to protect citizens and infrastructure; and the Homeland 
Security Center, a continual monitoring and reporting operation. 12 
Most observers agree that the program initiatives have been impressive. 13 
However, there has been much less agreement about whether the funding 
for homeland security is sufficient. The pre-9/11 budget of the agencies 
consolidated into the DHS was approximately $22 billion, and the Bush 
2003 budget proposal increased this total to $37.7 billion, "or roughly twice 
the original 2002 plan and four times what the government was spending 
on homeland security in the mid-1990s." 14 A FY 2003 supplemental 
appropriation passed in April added another $6.71 billion to the DHS's 
budget, of which $4.3 billion was allocated to Operation Liberty Shield and 
the remaining $2.4 billion was targeted to the airline industry to cover costs 
of improvements associated with thwarting terrorist acts. 15 Congress also 
established numerous federal grant programs in support of homeland-
security activities. It is no surprise that these assistance programs vary by 
type of recipients (state versus local governments), by allocation methods 
(formula versus categorical), and by requirements (match versus no match; 
maintenance of effort versus no maintenance of effort) .16 
Members of Congress from both parties declared the initial budget to 
be insufficient and complained that Bush was slow to request adequate 
funding. Quarrels over the DHS's budget persisted through 2002, holding 
hostage the 2002 domestic security funds. Law enforcement costs associated 
with each new change in the threat alert status imposed large financial 
"'The White House, First 100 days of Homl!land Security, 29 April 2003 (www.whitehouse.gov/news/ 
releases/2003/04). 
"Michael E. O'Hanlon etal., Protecting TheATTU!rican Homeland"One Year On (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2002), p.l25. 
"Ibid., 138. 
15U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security FY'03 Supplemental Funding 
Fact Sheet, Office of the Press Secretary, 16 April 2003 ( www.dhs.gov 1 dhspublic). 
16See U.S. General Services Administration, Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002). 
burdens on local governments and prompted a January 2003 letter to 
Congress from the U.S. Conference of Mayors in which the mayors pleaded 
for the $3.5 billion of federal funds promised the previous january. A study 
released in February 2003 by the National Fire Protection Association found 
that "only 13 percent of the nation's fire departments were prepared to 
deal with the collapse of buildings of 50 or more occupants, and that only 
about a quarter of the departments had equipment for easy communication 
with state and federal emergency-response agencies."17 In a speech to the 
National Governors Association (NGA) at the end of February 2003, Bush 
gave into the pleas from state and local officials as well as to mounting 
public pressure fanned by the Democrats and conceded that more money 
was needed for homeland security. Republicans especially from populous 
states with large metropolitan areas joined Democrats in a call to boost federal 
spending, and thus supported a larger federal share of total security costs. 18 
Bush finally signed a bill to pay for homeland security on 16 April 2003. 
Intergovernmental implementation problems plagued the efforts to 
enhance domestic security capabilities. While jokes about the Ready 
Campaign's admonitions to citizens to buy duct tape and plastic sheeting 
with which to create "safe rooms" gained the nation's attention, more serious 
issues received less notice. For example, the plan to vaccinate health-care 
workers against smallpox forced many state and local public health agencies 
to transfer their own monies from other services to pay for the vaccinations. 
Communication and information-sharing failures frustrated progress. A 
General Accounting Office (GAO) report found that nine federal agencies, 
a year and half after 9/11, had yet to promote inter-agency sharing of 
terrorist "watch lists." Obstacles included different types of databases and 
software as well as a lack of agency policies. While information sharing 
among federal agencies, as described by GAO, was "inconsistent and 
limited," the Police Executive Research Forum, in its own report, noted 
that many local police officials complained that" ... the FBI still kept them 
uninformed about terrorist developments." Senator Charles Grassley (R-
IA) criticized the agencies by noting "Federal bureaucracies have an 
institutional disease where they think they own their information. Our 
state and local police can't watch out for anybody if they're kept in the 
dark." 19 Another GAO study found state and local health units varied 
tremendously in their levels of preparedness for a bioterrorism attack. 
Problems identified in the report included workforce shortages, 
inadequacies in disease surveillance and laboratory systems, lack of regional 
coordination and compatible communication systems, absence of specific 
"Philip Shenon, "Lack of Attack Readiness Laid to Financing Delay by U.S., New l'Ork Times, 13 February 
2003 (Netscape version). 
18John Machacek and Susan Roth, "Split Looms over $4B for Security," USA Today, 26 March 2003 
(Netscape version). 
19Eric Lichtblau, "Agencies Still Fail to Share Information, Reports Say," New York Times, 30 April2003 
(Netscape version). 
federal standards on appropriate level of preparedness, and lack of federal 
guidelines on assessing vulnerabilities for food borne or waterborne diseases.20 
By contrast, few problems were reported about the intergovernmental 
flow of funds. The National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) 
reported on 2 April 2003 that states had expended or obligated 76 percent 
of the 1999 to 2002 federal monies distributed by the Office of Domestic 
Preparedness (ODP) and the remainder of the FY2002 funds were in the 
process of being obligated. NEMA's study also showed that 81 percent of 
all ODP grant monies sent to the states were passed through to local 
governments, and in a number of cases the pass-through was 100 percent. 
A major problem identified in the NEMA report was the uncertainty of the 
federal budget process. Because of delays in the passage of the federal 
budget, states received three years of OD P funding in a period of six months 
between Spring and Fall 2002.21 
Other critical implementation issues have yet to be resolved and are not 
likely to be in the near future. The current intergovernmental system 
designed to respond to natural disasters has been built up over several 
decades, and it can be expected that these arrangements will perform 
effectively provided a terrorist-induced incident exhibits features associated 
with natural disasters. Less certain is the ability of the system to handle 
attacks that do not fit the natural disaster mold such as bioterrorism or 
radiological contamination.22 Similarly, the country's highly decentralized 
law enforcement institutions confront a much more difficult coordination 
challenge to identifY, monitor, and apprehend highly trained terrorists, 
especially so-called "lone wolf' terrorists. Decisions about targeting public 
resources to high probability or important symbolic targets versus ensuring 
some minimal level of protection to all locations pose devilish problems. 
How does one decide among public infrastructure, communication systems, 
food supplies, financial systems, monuments, and the needs of special 
populations such as school children? 
Perhaps the most important intergovernmental issue is the classic 
question of the appropriate division of responsibilities among the federal, 
state, and local governments. There is already pressure to "federalize" 
activities-whether by preemptions or by mandates-that have been in the 
domain of state and local governments. In some cases, federal agencies 
have acted to centralize control as has happened in transportation; in other 
cases, state and local officials have sought national guidelines and standards 
as in public health. But the federal government does not possess enough 
"'U.S. General Accounting Office, Biotenvrism: Preparedness Varied across State and Local jurisdictions 
(Washington, DC: GA0-0~373, April 2003). 
"National Emergency Management Association, State Spending of Homeland Security Funds (Lexington, 
KY: 2 April 2003). 
27Paul Posner, "Speaker's Remarks," The Role of"Home" in Homeland Security- The Federalism Challenge: 
The Challenge for State and Local Government (Albany, NY: Rockefeller Institute of Government, 24 March 
2003, Symposium series no. 2), pp.ll>-30. 
resources-money, expertise, personnel-to assume total responsibility for 
domestic security. Instead, intergovernmental and intersectoral partnerships 
are more likely to create effective as well as legitimate arrangements by 
which to conduct planning, share information, establish new 
communication and information systems, solve interoperability problems, 
develop surge capacity (i.e. meet a rapid increase in demand for a given 
good or service), and finance required activities. 
Similarly, the division of responsibilities and obligations will have to be 
determined within each state. Tensions between state and local officials as 
well as intrastate feuds among local officials have surfaced and are likely to 
increase in frequency rather than decrease. Donald Ketti summarized the 
intergovernmental issues related to the implementation of homeland 
security policies: 
... homeland security is primarily an issue of coordination, but coordination 
is fundamentally a problem in intergovernmental relations and federalism. 
Left to its own devices, federalism is not likely to respond effectively. It's 
going to require some innovative strategies for coming at this problem. 
The consequences of failing to do so could very well prove to be dangerous-
even catastrophic-so the urgency for attacking this problem is huge. 23 
Whether federalism responds effectively to the threat of future terrorist 
attacks will depend critically on the willingness of officials at all levels of 
government to see the interests of their agency or jurisdiction as bound 
together with the interests of other agencies and jurisdictions. It is only a 
sense of common interest that can serve as the basis for collaborative actions 
and as a brake on dysfunctional competition. 
Homeland Security and Civil Liberties 
Since its passage in October 2001, the USA Patriot Act (P.L. 1 07-56) has 
become a political lightening rod for an increasingly acrimonious debate 
among those who advocate aggressive actions against possible or suspected 
terrorists, those who worry about a possible diminution of civil liberties and 
political freedoms, and those who oppose any growth in government and 
its authority. A "politics makes strange bedfellows" coalition of groups on 
the left and on the right that believe the Patriot Act gave too much intrusive 
power to the federal government has emerged in many places around 
country. These alliances against "Big Brother" have been successful in 
persuading local governments to enact resolutions denouncing the Patriot 
Act.24 Sixty-five jurisdictions between April and mid:July 2003 approved 
resolutions calling for the repeal of the Act, bringing the total to 134 cities 
"Donald KettJ, "Speaker's Remarks," The Role of "Home" in Homeland Security- The Federalism Challenge: 
The Challenge for State and Local Government (Albany, NY: Rockefeller Institute of Government, 24 March 
2003, Symposium series no. 2), p.I5 . 
.. Associated Press, "Town criminalizes compliance with Patriot Act," 18 May 2003 (http:// 
cnn. usnews.printhis.clickability.com). 
and counties, plus three states: Alaska, Hawaii, and Vermont.25 A U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) inspector general's report in late July 
"identified dozens of cases in which department employees have been 
accused of serious civil rights and civil liberties violations" in their 
enforcement of the act. 26 The multiplicity of jurisdictions that make up 
American federalism creates numerous opportunities for citizens of all 
political persuasions to voice their views. Consequently, the political battle 
over the proper balance of safeguards to ensure domestic security and 
safeguards of an individual's liberty will continue to be fought out 
intergovernmentally. 
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL POUCY MIX 
The 1 07'h Congress endured a protracted budget battle that stymied several 
items on Bush's "compassionate conservatism" agenda. Debates over 
homeland security funding and the Patriot Act were particularly passionate 
as were debates over "charitable choice" and the use of faith-based 
organizations to deliver social services. Senate Democrats worked hard to 
scuttle some administration initiatives, but divisions within the Republican 
m~ority in both chambers created even more serious challenges to the 
White House's policy leadership. Increasingly preoccupied with the situation 
in the Middle East and with the sluggish economy, Bush did not push much 
of his original agenda with the same fervor he did in gaining passage of the 
2001 No Child Left Behind ActY Consequently, by October 2002, not one 
of thirteen appropriations bills had been signed into law. 
Tax Cuts and Economic Stimulus 
President Bush greeted the 108m Congress with a stunning proposal that 
sought tax cuts much larger than had been expected even by supply-side 
advocates. The plan's core elements were threefold: (1) accelerate the 2001 
tax cuts, (2) end the double-taxation of dividends and provide aid to small 
businesses, and (3) extend unemployment benefits and create new re-
employment accounts to assist displaced workers regain employment.28 The 
obvious goal of the plan was to force feed even more stimulus into the 
national economy, which remained sluggish in spite of two previous tax 
cuts, lower interest rates, and a decline in the value of the dollar. The total 
price of the Bush proposal was $726 billion, of which ending taxes on 
corporate dividends would cost $400 billion. The remainder was accounted 
for by lowering personal income taxes to the 2006 rate immediately, ending 
the marriage penalty, and expanding investment deductions for small 
25Debbie Howlett, "Patriot Act battle is fought locally," USA Today, 16July 2003 (Netscape version). 
26Philip Shenon, "Report on USA Patriot Act Alleges Civil Rights Violations," New York Times, 21 July 
2003 (Netscape version). 
"'Dana Milbank, "President's Compassionate Agenda Lags: Bush's Legislative Record for Disadvantaged 
Found Wanting," WashingtonPost.com, 26 December 2002 (Netscape version). 
""The White House, "President Bush Taking Action to Strengthen America's Economy," Policies in 
Focus: jobs & Economic Growth, 7 January 2003 (www.whitehouse.gov). 
businesses. Although the new tax cuts would add substantially to the deficit, 
the Office of Management Budget's (OMB) macroeconomic assumption 
was the infusion of additional dollars into the economy would raise demand 
and create incentives for business to invest. Expectations for a swift victory 
were high because, for the first time in more than 20 years, one party was in 
control of the White House and both chambers of Congress. 
Announcement of the plan started a complicated fight over enabling 
legislation. Republicans were caught in a political dilemma between the 
long-standing opposition of many conservatives to the progressive income 
tax, which made Bush's plan attractive, and the public image of the party as 
favoring fat cats, which could be exploited by the Democrats. Once analysis 
of Bush's plan showed that 40 percent of the tax cuts would go to persons 
with incomes above $200,000 who make-up less than 5 percent of all 
taxpayers, the Democrats leveled charges of"class warfare" and raised serious 
concerns about the loss of revenues while the costs to pay for homeland 
security and the war mobilization already underway were growing rapidly. 
Bush responded with a FY 2004 budget proposal that would hold increases 
in discretionary spending to 4 percent (about $30 billion), or less than half 
the rate in FY 2003. Of course, entitlements with automatic expenditures, 
such as Social Security and Medicare, did not fall under the president's 
limit. Nearly half of the new monies (approximately $14 billion) would be 
allocated to the military, homeland security, veterans' affairs, and education 
for poor children, thus leaving other domestic programs to incur cutbacks.29 
The proposed reductions in domestic spending fell heavily on programs 
that aid the poor and near-poor, and consequently, beneficiaries and 
congressional champions promptly complained. Because it was clear the 
combination of tax cuts and spending cuts would not yield a balanced 
budget, deficit hawks in both parties were displeased. Others argued that 
the president's plan, in essence, traded domestic spending for tax cuts. 
Prominent public figures attacked the theory that tax cuts stimulate the 
economy. Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, stated 
"tax cuts were not needed for growth," and Warren Buffet, the nation's 
second wealthiest person and a guru of investors, declared the tax-cut 
proposal to be "voodoo economics" based on "Enron-style accounting."30 
State and local government officials were stunned by the potential 
negative impacts of the Bush tax cuts on their ability to raise revenues. The 
National Governors Association (NGA) and the National Conference of 
State Legislatures (NCSL) feared the end of federal taxation of corporate 
dividends would also stop state taxation of dividends with a resulting loss of 
tens of millions of dollars. They also feared that dividend stocks would be 
"'David E. Rosenbaum, "Bush Plans Little More Money for Bulk of Federal Programs," New York Times, 
22January 2003 (Netscape version). 
"'David E. Rosenbaum, "Greenspan Says Tax Cut Is Not Needed for Growth," New York Times, I May 
2003 (Netscape version); CNNMoney, "Buffet slams dividend tax cut," 20 May 2003 (www.cnnmoney.com). 
become a more attractive investment than municipal bonds, thus forcing 
localities to pay more interest to carry debt. State officials also worried that 
proposed changes in Medicaid funding effectively acted as a "loan" to the 
states and that they would have to pay back the modest temporary increase 
in federal Medicaid funds just as the baby boomers were retiring and when 
federal Medicaid monies were scheduled to decline. Some state and local 
officials expressed concern that the Bush budget proposals undercut the 
federal government's ability to maintain the long-standing "shared 
responsibility" for programs to assist poor citizens.31 
Given the Republican control of Congress, one might have predicted 
smooth sailing for Bush's tax-cut proposal. But rifts soon emerged among 
Republicans in both chambers. Senate Republicans found themselves 
divided over the impact of the tax cuts on deficits. For supply-side 
Republicans, reducing taxes was the road to economic growth; but for 
Republican moderates, reducing taxes was the road to fiscal ruin. House 
Republicans were divided along lines similar to their Senate counterparts, 
and soon the House reduced by the tax cut by $176 billion, or 24 percent. 
President Bush was not idle. Once formal hostilities in Iraq were 
proclaimed to be over, the president began to stump the country in support 
of the tax cuts. He had to convince Republican moderates to support his 
plan, and if that failed, convince a few Senate Democrats to switch their 
position. To gain votes from Senate moderates, the president agreed to 
support a $20 billion package of aid to state governments in the FY2004 
budget. Pushed by Senators Ben Nelson (D-NE), Susan Collins (R-ME), 
John Rockefeller (D-WV), and Gordon Smith (R-OR), the proposal would 
temporarily (over 18 months) increase the Federal Medical Assistance 
Percentage to Medicaid by 2.95 percent ($10 billion) and provide block 
grants for essential services and unfunded federal mandates ($10 billion). 
The trade-off for Bush was a small price to pay for additional votes in support 
of his tax cut. Mter a tie-breaking vote cast by Vice-President Dick Cheney, 
the Senate on 15 May 2003 passed President Bush's tax plan on a 51-49 vote. 
Unfortunately, the bill passed by the Senate treated dividends differently 
than the House bill, and the House bill included a tax reduction on capital 
gains; these differences necessitated a conference committee. A week of 
negotiations made tense by partisanship, personality clashes, policy 
differences, and rivalry between the two chambers forced the president to 
plead with congressional Republicans to end the intra-party feuding. 32 
Finally, in a session presided over by the vice president, the conference 
committee gained the needed 50 votes. On 28 May 2003, President Bush 
signed the jobs and Growth Act of2003 (P.L. 108-27), the third tax cut in 
three years. 
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Triumph lasted barely one day as child-advocacy groups discovered that 
the increase in the per child tax credit from $600 to $1,000 would not apply 
to families with incomes between $10,500 and $26,625. These families work 
at jobs paying at or just above minimum wages. The conference committee 
dropped these families from the increased tax credit during the final feverish 
negotiations over the tax bill as part of their efforts to bring the tax plan 
under a $350 billion ceiling. The gap itself is a function of an inflation-
indexed formula in the 2001 Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act (P.L. 107-16). Once the omission became public, all the 
political tensions surrounding passage of the 2003 act resurfaced. Again, 
inter-party as well as intra-party differences hardened and negotiations 
dragged on through june and into late july. 
Bush's ability in leading Congress to enact laws reducing taxes in three 
consecutive years is a striking example of political adeptness. Few presidents 
have been so successful, even those who also benefitted from a Congress 
controlled by their party.33 The president followed his faith in supply-side 
economics and his belief the 2001 and 2002 tax cuts helped the economy. 
In the face of a $455 billion deficit, Bush gambled that even more tax cuts 
would give another strong boost to the economy and that the anticipated 
growth would avoid the soaring deficits that forced President Ronald Reagan 
to enact a tax increase. Whether this gamble succeeds will be determined 
by the course of the economy, but from a political perspective, this third 
tax cut appears to have several important consequences. First, the president 
continued his take-charge image with another action to move the economy 
forward; once again, he put money into the voters' pockets, he pleased the 
conservative base of his party, and once more, he put the opposition party 
on the defensive.34 Second, the spending reductions required to keep the 
total cost of the package within the $350 billion ceiling as demanded by 
Senator George Voinovich (R-OH) further reduce the ability of the federal 
government to enact new programmatic initiatives or to continue to pay 
the full cost for programs shared with the states such as Medicaid.35 Third, 
the increased and steady use of tax policy to effectuate change justifies a 
further reduction in the federal bureaucracy. Fourth, the three Bush tax 
cuts, with little regard for the deficit expansion they create, constitute a 
complete reversal of the traditional Republican position as defenders of 
the treasury and opponents of profligate public spending. Many current 
Republicans believe it is more important to cut taxes and limit the size of 
government than it is to balance the budget. Conservative strategist Grover 
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Norquist articulates this view, "If we had a little teeny government and a big 
deficit, I wouldn't care. It's the size of government we're focused on. It's 
also the size of government the left is focused on. "36 In essence, the Bush 
crusade to lower federal taxes leaves the Democrats unable "to tax and 
spend" if they regain control of Congress or the White House. 
The consequences for states and localities are equally restrictive. The 
small $20 billion aid package in the 2003 act will lower each state's deficit 
only marginally; it will not resolve the fiscal crisis. More likely, Washington's 
continuing use of unfunded mandates such as those in education policy 
will worsen budget problems, and will push state and local governments to 
raise taxes. In fact, governors of both parties have proposed tax increases 
for FY2004. Politically, Bush can claim credit for bold action to boost the 
national economy while avoiding fall-out from any reduction in services 
delivered by state and local governments. 
Education 
The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001 (P.L. 107-110), the first 
major legislative victory of the Bush presidency, is experiencing the normal 
"implementation pains" associated with all new public programs. Although 
considerable support exists for NCLB's core goals of improving the 
achievement of all students, closing the achievement gaps between various 
racial and ethnic subgroups of students, and raising teacher quality, the list 
of complaints by state and local officials about the act identifies most of the 
barriers commonly encountered in program implementation. A report 
entitled From the Capital to the Classroom: State and Federal Efforts to Implement 
the No Child Left Behind Act, issued by the Center for Education Policy, finds 
significant progress being made by the states in "revising their assessment 
systems and developing and refining their approaches to track the quality 
of teachers." State officials, however, "are also expressing significant concern 
about the speed of implementation, the costs required, the government's 
focus on compliance over flexibility, and some unanticipated 
consequences."37 Major obstacles to effective implementation of the NCLB, 
as identified by state officials, are shortcomings in funding, guidance, 
flexibility, time, consistency, and accuracy. State officials also point out they 
have seen little parental interest in school choice, a key element of the 
NCLB, and yet they are frustrated the federal government insists that "lack 
of capacity in a school is not grounds for refusing choice" because this 
requirement "could result in overcrowded schools, lowering the achievement 
of already good schools. "38 
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To measure improvement, the act requires the use of achievement tests 
that are "scientifically based" in grades three through eight, and states had 
until 31 January 2003 to submit plans for the use of standardized tests. Final 
regulations from the U.S. Department of Education (ED) were not 
promulgated until late November 2002, thus leaving school officials little 
time to complete their plans. The act also mandates states raise the 
achievement levels of students in each of five distinct racial and ethnic 
subgroups as well as low-income students, disabled students, and students 
with little or no English proficiency. A school may be declared as "low-
performing" if any of the subgroups in the school fail to improve over two 
consecutive years - even if these are two different subgroups each of the 
two years. Schools labeled as "low performing" for several years in a row 
face serious consequences, including the loss of federal monies and possible 
reorganization. 
As states have begun testing, the results have not been very positive, and 
a significant number of schools in many states, even those with high 
accountability standards, may be declared "low-performing." For example, 
the Texas Board of Education, based on "grim results" from the first year of 
testing, "voted to reduce the number of questions students must answer 
correctly to pass it, to 20 out of 26, from 24, for third-grade reading." It is 
ironic that Texas, the state Bush held up as the model for NCLB, should 
find itself now in the position of lowering testing standards.39 Other states 
such as Michigan and Colorado also lowered their standards to minimize 
the number of schools found to be "low-performing." Ohio decided to 
raise achievement levels from 40 to 60 percent by 2009, and then raise levels 
from 60 to the required 100 percent for all subgroups by the federal deadline 
of 2014. Ohio's plan requires a jump in annual improvement from 3.3 
percent to 10 percent for 2010 to 2014. Chester Finn, former assistant 
secretary of education, in discussing this situation, said: "Some states are 
lowering the passing scores, they're redefining schools in need of 
improvement and they're deferring the hard task of achievement-boosting 
into the distant future .... That's really a cynical approach."40 
The act also establishes higher standards for teacher's credentials; in 
particular, all teachers must have a college degree in the discipline of each 
major course they teach or they must pass an examination to demonstrate 
they are "highly qualified" to teach the subject matter. The effect of this 
requirement has hit rural communities especially hard because rural schools 
often have one instructor for multiple subjects. "We have so many schools 
where one person teaches biology, chemistry, physics and the physical, earth 
and life sciences. This law would make them have a major in each subject-
and that's just physically impossible," stated Don Christensen, Nebraska 
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Commissioner ofEducation.41 Officials in other rural states have expressed 
concerns that NCLB was designed to reform big-city schools, but because it 
is a "one-size fits all" policy, it contains numerous provisions unworkable in 
rural areas. 
NCLB is not only suffering from the problems typical to implementation, 
but it is also becoming a sore point in federal-state relations. Dan Langan, a 
U.S. Department of Education spokesperson, claims: "This law appropriately 
identifies education as a national priority, and we believe it values and respects 
local autonomy." Richard Elmore, professor of education at Harvard 
University, called the law "the single largest, and the single most damaging 
expansion of federal power over the nation's school system in history. "42 Jack 
Jennings, director of the Center on Education Policy, offered the middle 
ground in this debate as he discussed the results of the center's report on 
NCLB: "Delays in providing crucial information and threats of rigorous 
enforcement have made state leaders increasingly anxious about how to go 
about introducing the most sweeping changes in education in 40 years."43 
Welfare &form 
The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act (PRWORA) was scheduled for reauthorization in 2002, but Congress 
and the president wrangled over various changes far into 2003. Failure to 
re-approve PRWORA and its primary program, the Temporary Assistance 
to Needy Families (TANF) block grant, left the states with little choice but 
to begin cutting aid to low-income families. During the mid- to late 1990s 
when the national economy was booming, states were able to reduce welfare 
rolls by more than 60 percent; families on monthly cash assistance in 1994 
exceeded five million, but by July 2002, the number had fallen to just above 
two million.44 States, once they made the adjustment from the previous Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) entitlement to the 1996 TANF 
block grant, broadened their spending to assist low-income working families 
with child care and other supports (e.g., transportation, work clothes, and 
job placement). In FY1998, state TANF outlays were about $3. 2 billion 
below the annual federal block grant of $16.5 billion; by FY 2002, state 
outlays exceeded the federal block grant by nearly $2.2 billion.45 As fewer 
previously unemployed persons remained on cash assistance and more were 
working, albeit at low-wage jobs, states increased their expenditures to ensure 
low-income families stay employed. By FY 2001, states were spending 38 
percent of their state and federal TANF funds on cash assistance (a drop of 
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60 percent from FY1998) and 30 percent of their combined funds on child 
care and other aid to low income working families. 46 
Although the states had built up considerable reserve funds because of 
early under-spending on TANF, these funds were drawn down rapidly to 
pay for rising child-care costs because many of the previously unemployed 
AFDC recipients were women who are the heads of families and who need 
child-care assistance to remain at work. State legislators and governors had 
few options in the face of the deepening fiscal crisis but to reduce state 
TANF expenditures. States have diminished TANF services by making child 
care less accessible, by cutting back programs designed to improve recipients' 
work skills, and in some states ending aid to low-income familiesY 
In January 2003, Bush asked Congress to extend TANF for five years and 
to revise it following his previously announced plan entitled "Working 
Toward Independence." The House of Representatives in February 2003 
passed a bill to re-authorize TANF but only included $1 billion in new funds 
over five years for child care, more than 85 percent below the Congressional 
Budget Office's (CBO) estimates of needed funds. By contrast, a bipartisan 
proposal in the Senate provided $6 billion in additional federal dollars for 
child care over the next five years. House opponents to the Senate's 
additional child-care monies argued the states had not exhausted their 
reserve funds for TANF. Once the tax cut bill was passed, House Republicans 
also objected to additional child-care dollars because the states had won 
$20 billion in temporary federal aid, half of which could be used for purposes 
other than Medicaid.48 These and other differences stymied progress on 
the reauthorization of TANF. 
Other Bush welfare proposals targeted Section 8 housing subsidies and 
food stamps. In February 2003, Bush sought to replace the Section 8 
program, the federal government's largest rental subsidy program, with a 
block grant as part of a larger effort to shift housing and other social 
programs such as food stamps to the states. This devolutionary move, 
according to the White House, "would give states the ability to streamline 
disparate poverty programs."49 The proposed housing block grant would 
send $13.6 billion in Section 8 funds to the states instead of directly to local 
public housing authorities, as is currently the case. This transfer from local 
to state authority would constitute a major shift in the administrative and 
political dynamics of the program. Elizabeth Morris, chief executive of the 
San Diego Housing Commission, reflected the view of many local housing 
authority officials in her assessment of the proposal: "Who needs an extra 
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layer of bureaucracy? States would take 5 percent to 10 percent of the money 
for administrative costs, so there might be less for low-income families."50 
Closely related to the proposed shift of programs to the states was the 
administration's move to crack down on alleged errors and fraud in the 
National School Lunch Program (NSLP). If a family's income is only 130 
percent of the poverty level, a student is eligible for a free lunch. If a family's 
income is no more than 185 percent of the poverty level, the cost of the 
lunch is subsidized. The Food and Nutrition Service, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, "estimates that as many as a quarter of children getting free 
lunches may come from households with incomes too high to qualify." 
Efforts by the IRS to determine the level of errors by asking families for 
documentation of their incomes led to a 21 percent drop in eligibility for 
free lunches and a 8.8 percent drop in eligibility for subsidized lunchesY 
Opponents countered the changes would eliminate approximately 2.4 
million children from the NSLP and cut the food-stamp maximum benefit 
from 91 cents per day to 84 cents per day. Further, opponents noted that 
the House bill to enact the president's plan would lead to a cut of $265 
billion from entitlement programs over 10years, of which $165 billion would 
come out of programs that assist low-income Americans. 
Taken together, Bush's recommendations on welfare reform and social 
services for low income families are retracing the policy path carved out by 
the Reagan administration-enact a tax cut, reduce social services to the 
poor, block grant numerous individual programs, cap federal dollars for 
the block grants, and downplay the long-term effects of deficits. Bush's 
stance on social policy continues the 30-year Republican effort begun by 
President Richard M. Nixon to return social service program responsibility 
to the states. 
Faith-Based Initiatives 
The White House established in January 2001 an Office of Faith-Based 
and Community Initiatives to lead and support centers in seven federal 
agencies to help faith-based and community organizations compete for 
federal grants on a more equal basis with secular organizations, receive 
more private support, and encounter fewer bureaucratic barriers. On 3 
October 2002, Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Tommy G. 
Thompson announced the creation of a $30 million fund to help faith-
based and community organizations enhance their capacity and improve 
their ability to provide social services to those in need. The Compassion 
Capital Fund, as the new grant is titled, awarded $24.8 million to 21 so-
called "intermediary organizations," and these organizations in turn made 
sub-awards to small faith-based (FBOs) and community-based organizations 
(CBOs) to pay for start-up costs, operation or expansion of programs, and 
"'Robert Pear, "Aid to Poor faces More Scrutiny," New York Time.s, 5 february 2003 (Netscape version). 
51 Kaufman, "Are the Poor Suffering from Hunger Anymore?" 
other forms of technical assistance and non-religious social services. Another 
$850,000 was awarded to three universities and a private firm to conduct 
research on ways in which FBOs and CBOs can provide social services and 
on the roles these organizations play in the lives of their communities. HHS 
contracted for $2.2 million with Dare Mighty Things to establish a national 
resource center and clearinghouse for information on technical assistance 
to FBOs and CBOs, and HHS also awarded a $1.35 million contract to Branch 
Associates to evaluate innovative practices and promising approaches used 
by FBOs and CBOs so that these innovations may be disseminated to other 
organizations. 52 
The administration views the Compassion Capital Fund as an important 
tool to remove barriers that prevent FBOs and CBOs from competing for 
federal funding. The justification for incorporating sectarian organizations 
into the social-service delivery system is that FBOs "have unique strengths 
that government cannot duplicate."53 These strengths include operating 
in the daily lives of persons and families in need, reaching individuals and 
families the government cannot, existing as part of a local community and 
thus being able to understand the community, holding the trust of their 
community neighbors and leaders, possessing a cultural awareness of issues 
and relationships in their communities, and working from a sense of mission 
and dedication to service that translates into unique approaches to service 
delivery. 54 Opponents see these faith-based initiatives as a violation of church 
and state. Furthermore, it is not the case that FBOs face barriers that prevent 
them from competing for social service dollars; in many states, religious 
organizations, such as Lutheran Family Services and Catholic Charities, to 
name a few, routinely receive social services contracts and grants from state 
and local governments, including for programs funded by the federal 
government. A news report about one research study calls into question 
the view that FBOs are better at social service delivery. A study in Indiana 
found no difference between secular and religious organizations in job 
placement rates or starting wages of the people who received job training 
from the 27 organizations studied. Interestingly, persons trained by the 
FBOs, once employed, worked fewer hours on average and were less likely 
to receive health insurance.55 
Just as Bush's welfare-reform proposal struggled in Congress, so have his 
"faith-based initiatives." The House in 2001 passed legislation to enable 
FBOs to receive federal money for social services and included a 
controversial section preempting state and local anti-discrimination laws 
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from applying to FBOs operating federally funded programs. The Senate 
Republican leadership could not immediately approve a companion 
measure which did not include the anti-discrimination provision. Eventually, 
the Republicans decided to strip the faith-based language out of the bill 
and move forward the bill's provisions on tax deductions to: (a) encourage 
charitable giving, (b) reduce the federal excise tax on charitable 
foundations, (c) remove the tax penalty for rolling-over an Individual 
Retirement Account directly to a charity, and (d) permit low-income families 
to establish personal savings accounts with contributions matched by banks. 
The final bill also created a $1.3 billion block grant to social services 
charities. 56 However, by May, the House decided that it would not support 
the Senate's and the president's efforts to allow religious organizations to 
receive federal money for social services. Instead, the House moved to pass 
a bill in support of tax incentives for charitable contributions. Conservatives 
and liberals alike raised issues about the merits of the faith-based initiatives. 
For conservatives, the fear was that government money would secularize 
FBOs, while for liberals, the fear was government money would be diverted 
by FBOs to support evangelization as well as foster religious-based 
discrimination. These ideological differences suggest that the president's 
faith-based initiatives will not easily emerge from Congress. 
Health Care 
Pressure to resolve the nation's health-care problems rivaled in intensity 
and scope the pressure to secure the homeland. The upward trend of health-
care costs continued at a pace four times that of growth in the national 
economy. Health-care spending increased at a rate of 10 percent in 2001 
and 9.6 percent in 2002. Although overall 2002 health-care spending was 
less than in 2001, private health insurance premiums increased an average 
of 15 percent in 2003, even while private plans shifted more costs to the 
payer.57 These figures underline the failure of managed care plans to bring 
health-care costs under control. By contrast, Medicare spending in 2001 
rose only 7.8 percent, about half the rate of private insurance plans. 58 
The Bureau of the Census estimated that41.2 million Americans did not 
have health insurance in 2001, or 14.6 percent of Americans. The number 
of children not covered by health insurance was 8.5 million, or 11.7 percent. 59 
The U.S. spends more per capita on health care than any other industrialized 
nation, and health-care spending accounted for 14.1 percent of GDP. By 
comparison, health-care spending in 2000 as a percentage of GDP was 10.7 
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percent in Switzerland, 10.6 percent in Germany, 9.5 percent in France, 
and 9.1 percent in Canada.60 
In his January 2003 State of the Union address, President Bush committed 
an additional $400 billion over the next decade to reform and strengthen 
Medicare. The policy would offer individuals more choices through private 
health-insurance plans and encourage persons on Medicare to move from 
the government-managed program to one of the private health plans. The 
availability of a prescription-drug benefit was included as an incentive to 
move to a private plan. It is important to recall that Medicare does not 
provide prescription drugs, but Medicaid does cover drug costs. 
Bush's reform would replace the Great Society entitlement of specific 
benefits for all with a variety of plans that differ in their benefits and costs. 
Early supporters of Bush's proposal touted its ability to modernize a program 
designed in 1965 and to restrain the growth in outlays for Medicare. 
Opponents immediately raised concerns and doubts about Bush's plan. 
While Democrats attacked the abandonment of the principles of equity 
and universality as well as the move to a market-based approach to health 
care akin to the discredited proposal to privatize Social Security, key 
Republican committee chairs in the House and Senate opposed the 
president's position that the elderly would have to leave the government-
operated Medicare program to obtain a prescription-drug benefit. 
State officials, when asked to support the Bush plan, responded instead 
with numerous concerns and reservations. These concerns grew when Bush 
announced an additional proposal to alter Medicaid by giving states much 
more discretion to expand, reduce, or eliminate benefits for low-income 
'persons served by Medicaid. In return for this expanded discretion, states 
would receive a fixed amount of federal money, according to a formula, in 
each of the next ten years. In effect, Medicaid would become a block grant. 
The NGAsent the White House a listof60 questions related to the Medicaid 
proposal. Especially worrisome to the governors was the fixed amount of 
funds for a program in which costs were escalating.61 
This bipartisan opposition to Bush's plan did not reach the intensity of 
the firestorm that flared up when President Bill Clinton attempted to reform 
health care, but the resistance was sufficient to persuade the president to 
retool his proposal. On 4 March 2003, Bush announced his "Framework to 
Modernize and Improve Medicare." In it, he committed $400 billion over 
ten years in his FY2004 budget to pay for reforms in Medicare. To implement 
Bush's principle of giving seniors more choice, the Framework included 
three options from which seniors could choose.62 Other important elements 
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of the Framework were an immediate provision of discount drug cards to 
all seniors and an immediate $600 subsidy to low-income seniors to help 
pay for prescription drugs. 
The differential prescription-drug benefit, proposed by Bush as a lure to 
encourage Medicare participant movement to private health plans, became 
the focus of the debates over the president's initiative. The most serious 
obstacle for the president was the opposition of rural state senators from 
both parties, in particular, Sen. Charles Grassley (R-IA) who chaired the all-
important Finance Committee which had jurisdiction over the proposed 
plan. Grassley and other rural state senators such as Max Baucus (D-MT), 
the ranking member of the Finance Committee, worried that the differential 
drug incentive would not help their constituents because in rural areas 
"private health plans have historically been unavailable or inaccessible to 
Medicare beneficiaries."63 
Especially problematic for the president was the unremitting resistance 
of many governors, including Jeb Bush (R-FL) and John G. Rowland (R-
CT), to changing Medicaid funding to a fixed amount of federal money 
over the next ten years. Medicaid is the nation's largest health-insurance 
program and provides services to 50 million low-income persons, not all of 
whom are elderly. States pay about 43 percent of total program costs, and 
Medicaid costs are the fastest growing area of state budgets ( 13 percent in 
2002). The White House entered into secret negotiations with the governors, 
but these sessions failed, partly because the governors themselves could 
not agree. Some governors supported the president, but others preferred 
different solutions, among which were (a) annual or biennial recalculation 
of the federal share of Medicaid, (b) continue the open-ended entitlement 
to the most vulnerable recipients, but cap the federal funds for about one-
third of the recipients, and (c) give the states discretion to vary Medicaid 
benefits by different population groups. The one problem that all governors 
agreed had to be resolved was that of the so-called "dual eligibles," or persons 
who are fully eligible for Medicare and Medicaid, most of whom are in 
nursing homes. The six million "dual eligibles" are 12 percent of the 
Medicaid population, and services to them consume over 30 percent of the 
program's expenses. Bush's plan to include a prescription-drug benefit in 
Medicare would allow states to shift the current $7 billion per year cost of 
drugs to the federally funded Medicaid program, if Medicare participants 
switched to the market-based options. However, the Bush plan did nothing 
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to help states with the $24 billion a year cost of nursing home care for "dual 
eligibles"-a cost expected to rise sharply as the aged lived longer.64 
In early June 2003, Bush abandoned his attachment to the differential 
prescription-drug benefit and accepted the provision of equal drug benefits 
for individuals in traditional Medicare and in the market-based plans. Late 
june brought the president a surprising piece of good news; Senator Ted 
Kennedy (D-MA) announced he would support the Bush plan now that it 
offered equal drug benefits in all options. By the end of june, companion 
measures on Medicare passed both houses by votes of 76-21 in the Senate 
and 216-215 in the House, where several conservative advocates of market-
based social policy joined Democrats in opposition to the equal drug benefit 
provision. Important differences between both bills remained, and had to 
be resolved in conference. That the conference committee remained 
deadlocked into August gave testimony to the complexity of the issues and 
to the intensity of the opposing sides. 
The struggle to enact a major change in a long-standing federal program 
offers instructive lessons about the nature of policy formulation in i\merica's 
federal system. First, the story here confirms the old adage about domestic 
policy that "what the president proposes, the Congress disposes." Senator 
Grassley in describing the negotiations in Washington, D.C., to his 
constituents in Iowa illustrates the power of Congress: 
When it finally got said and done, Bush never had a bill to present to 
Congress, because they didn't really know what they we're doing. Not 
that their ideas were wrong, but they didn't have them well thought out, 
or put together in a perfect piece of legislation. So they ended up just 
establishing some principles. Now, those of us who have been working on 
Medicare and prescription drugs for the last two or three years, we feel 
like we know how to do it. So what we finally talked the president into, 
back in probably February or early March, was, 'We ain't going to wait for 
a bill; we're going to go ahead'."65 
Second, the alignment of proponents and opponents is not determined 
solely by partisan affiliation; the nation's electoral geography also strongly 
influences policy positions taken by members of Congress, as evidenced by 
the bipartisan alignment of rural senators opposed to the president's 
differential drug benefit as well as the abandonment of traditional Medicare. 
Third, state governors, as officials independent of the nation's chief 
executive officer, can often exercise strong influence on the course of 
congressional legislation that contradicts the president's position.66 Fourth, 
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significant changes in one major program in a policy area are likely to 
provoke demands to make compensatory changes in complementary 
programs. Reform of Medicare meant addressing its interaction with 
Medicaid. Fifth, complicated public programs emerge not just from the 
competing goals various factions seek to incorporate into the legislation, 
but also from the political compromises necessary to build a majority coalition 
in support of a viable measure. Finally, Bush's Medicare reform plan 
illustrates the usual process by which new social policy is made in the United 
States. A crisis builds, several alternative solutions are brought forward by 
various groups and officials, and under the pressure to avoid blame for failure 
to act on the pressing problem, compromises are forged in such a way as to 
permit most sides to claim some credit for the new program.67 
THE STATES 
In the November 2002 election, 36 of the 50 governorships (nearly three-
fourths) were contested as were over 6,200 of the 7,400 state legislative 
seats. The election produced two dozen new governors, half Democrats 
and half Republicans, thus narrowing the partisan split among state 
executives to 26 Republicans and 24 Democrats. Twenty of the 24 new 
governors replaced incumbents of the other party, and four women were 
elected as governors, bringing the national total to six. Critically for the 
Democrats, they recaptured governorships in 13 of the 20 most populous 
states, consequently, "more Americans will be living under Democratic 
governors than under Republicans-at least 20 million more, as a matter of 
fact." 68 Republicans for the first time in 50 years became a majority of state 
legislators; they controlled 22 statehouses, the Democrats controlled 16 state 
legislatures, 11 remained divided, and one is officially nonpartisan. 
Nationally, the total partisan division by chambers is very close; for state 
senates it is 974 Republicans to 939 Democrats, and for state houses it is 
2694 Democrats and 2687 Republicans.69 
The biggest electoral change was not so much a partisan one as it was 
one of general turnover because half of the new governors and more than 
a quarter of the state legislators were new to office, and many of these elected 
officials had never served in state government.70 No doubt some of this 
turnover was due to term limits because "a total of 322 legislators in 11 
states will be termed out in the 2002 elections ... " with 71 percent of 
Michigan's Senate ineligible for re-election and 45 percent ofthe Missouri 
House. 71 These new governors and state legislators faced an unusually large 
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number of serious policy challenges from education, health care, and welfare 
to air quality, economic growth, homeland security, and information privacy, 
yet their ability to address these issues was severely constrained by the 
continuation of the states' fiscal crisis into a third year. 
A Financial Disaster of Biblical Proportions 
The financial trauma of the American states that began in the last two 
quarters of 2001 worsened in a steadily agonizing fashion through 2002. 
Thirty-seven states were forced to reduce their already enacted FY 2002 
budgets by more than $12.8 billion. 72 Efforts to halt the fiscal slide were 
drastic. On the expenditure side of the ledger, 28 states cut budgets across-
the-board, 22 states used reserve funds, 17laid off employees, eight offered 
early retirement programs, 10 reorganized programs. On the revenue side, 
in 15 states governors proposed sales tax increases, 10 states raised personal 
income taxes, 11 states closed loopholes and eliminated credits in corporate 
income taxes, 14 states raised excise taxes on cigarettes, tobacco, and alcohol, 
19 states raised various fees, two states increased motor vehicle taxes, and 
17 states raised additional revenue through gaming taxes, nursing home 
surcharges, and hotel occupancy taxes. But these massive efforts failed to 
halt the slide, and by the end ofFY 2003, the states' general fiscal condition 
had sunk to levels not seen since before World War II. 
The tide of red ink that has flooded the states for three straight years 
became a disaster of biblical proportions, as evidenced by the gallows humor 
of Governor Tim Pawlenty (R-MN) who said, "I joke with people that the 
only things we're waiting for are the plagues and locusts."73 The Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities described the fiscal crisis as "severe" and 
explained: 
States are facing budget deficits of approximately $100 billion that must 
be closed over the next several months- $25 billion in the deficits for the 
current fiscal year and between $70 and $85 billion for the fiscal year that 
begins in june. These new budget gaps are on top of the $50 billion gap 
states closed when they enacted their fiscal year 2003 budgets.74 
State reserve funds-composed of final fiscal year balances plus "rainy 
day" funds-have nearly disappeared. Total state fiscal balances had peaked 
in FY 2000 at $48.8 billion (10.4 percent of expenditures), but by the end 
of FY 2003 had plummeted to a mere $6.4 billion (1.3 percent of 
expenditures), a fall of 87 percent! Little wonder that as of 1 July 2003, 19 
states predicted negative growth for FY 2004. 75 
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Changes in Expenditures and Revenues 
State officials tried valiantly to stem the tide of deficits. NCSL President 
and Oklahoma State Senator Angela Monson observed, "Broad cost-cutting 
measures are being enacted everywhere. Lawmakers are leaving no stone 
unturned. Services once thought to be sacred are now on the chopping 
block. K-12 education, social services, Medicaid eligibility, corrections are 
all being scaled back as states struggle to bring their books into balance."76 
Even the slaughter of sacred cows did not prevent 37 states from having to 
revise downward by nearly $14.5 billion their already enacted FY 2003 
budgets-"the largest spending cut in the history of the 27 year-old Fiscal 
Survey" published jointly by NGA and the National Association of State 
Budget Officers (NASB0).77 
Stories of extreme decisions taken by state officials abound; for example, 
the governor of Missouri ordered every third light bulb unscrewed to save 
money, Connecticut laid off prosecutors, and Oklahoma teachers doubled 
as janitors. While these stories underscore the desperation with which state 
officials have acted, they do not plumb the dimensions of the fiscal problem. 
From 1991 to 2001, total state spending went up 88 percent ($556 billion) 
with an average rate of 6.57 percent for the ten-year period. At the same 
time, population grew one percent per year, and inflation (for government 
purchases) increased 2.2 percent per annum. Simply put, inflation and 
population growth account for about half of state expenditure growth in 
the decade prior to the onset of the fiscal crisis. The rest of the expenditure 
growth can be accounted for by significant increases in five traditional areas 
of state responsibility: health, education, welfare, corrections, and state 
trust funds for pensions and workers' compensation. The 1 0-year percentage 
increase in total state spending for education was 89.97, for corrections it 
was 98.36, for the trust funds it was 84.64, for health and welfare (less 
Medicaid) it was 39.52, and for Medicaid alone it was an astounding 149.17. 
Taken together these five responsibilities comprise nearly three-fourths of 
total state spending. 78 These programmatic areas continued to shape state 
spending decisions even in the face of rapid decline in revenues. The june 
2003 Fiscal Survey of the States reported that actual state spending growth 
increased only 1.3 percent in 2002 and a mere 0.3 percent in 2003, and is 
expected to be down 0.1 percent in 2004. State expenditures for FY 2004 
will be led for the third consecutive year by Medicaid, which is budgeted 
for a 4.6 percent increase, while K-12 education is budgeted only for a 1.5 
percent increase and corrections for an increase of 1.1 percent. Higher 
education, by contrast, is budgeted for 2.3 percent less than 2003 levels.79 
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State real adjusted tax revenues began to climb with the end of the early 
1990s recession, and by 2000 the year-to-year growth had accelerated to 
more than 6 percent a year. In April 1998, the annual percentage change 
in state real adjusted tax revenue hit a peak of 10 percent in the 41 states 
with a personal income tax, and this figure was nearly matched in April 
2000. But April 2001 and 2002 produced negative revenue rates of 5.0 and 
13 percent respectively.8° Forty states had revenue collections less in FY 
2002 than in FY 2001, and in FY 2003 state revenues were only 0. 7 percent 
above FY 2002. Eleven states collected less revenue in 2003 than they did in 
2002, and nine states suffered with year-to-year declines in both years.81 In 
FY 2003, 30 states failed to make their budgeted revenue targets as sales tax 
collections were 2.5 percent below FY 2002, personal income tax was 8.6 
percent lower, and corporate income tax was 8.3 percent less.82 
The Impact of the Fiscal Crisis 
Studies of state responses to the protracted shortfalls in revenue agree 
that the typical strategy entailed several similar actions ( 1) draw down state 
reserve funds, (2) utilize numerous accounting techniques to defer costs 
and accelerate revenues, (3) cut budgets, usually across-the-board, though 
some states protected K-12 education, and ( 4) borrow, often from state 
employee and teacher pension funds.83 As the deficits deepened over three 
years, fewer functions were exempted from expenditure reductions. The 
human impact of these budget cuts is increasingly widespread to the point 
that Jim Doyle, the new Democratic Governor of Wisconsin, lamented, 
"Everybody gets bad news."84 State government employment fell by 20,000 
from 2001 to 2002, and further reductions were expected through 2003. 
Nationally, states tightened Medicaid eligibility, and the estimated number 
of persons losing their Medicaid health insurance as of March 2003 was 1. 7 
million. A similar story occurred with TANF as several states reduced child-
care assistance thus making it harder for parents to remain in the workforce, 
even though they are required as a condition of aid. Numerous states made 
large cuts in fiscal assistance to local governments, and this left cities and 
counties with the choice between service reductions or revenue increases. 
Some states closed prisons or sharply reduced prisoner populations, often 
by moving non-violent offenders (typically first-time drug offenders) to 
parole status. Sharp reductions in state university and college budgets 
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coupled with double-digit tuition increases occurred in many states. Even 
primary and secondary education, the most sacred of cows, suffered financial 
cuts in FY 2003. By mid-year, 11 states implemented or planned to implement 
cuts in K-12 education. The results are larger class sizes, fewer subjects 
offered, and shorter school years.85 
These financial problems affiict New England and certain western states 
most severely, but, according to a recently completed study of state finances, 
"only 13 out of the 50 U.S. states are in a financially sustainable situation."86 
Although states cannot go bankrupt overnight, the study projects that more 
than 30 states will face long-term shortfalls in their finances. States with the 
biggest fiscal imbalances include New York, California, Pennsylvania, 
Arizona, Washington, Alaska, and Wyoming, and these states account for 
one-fifth of the nation's population. Demography in the form of aging 
populations is the primary factor causing the budget problem, and all of 
these states will be forced to raise taxes or cut expenditures by at least 10 
percent, or some equivalent mix of both. The immediacy and seriousness 
of the fiscal imbalance can be seen not just in the current cash flow problems, 
but also in the widening spread between yields on state and municipal bonds 
and U.S. Treasury notes as well as in the decline of state and local bond 
ratings.87 Most broadly, the states' fiscal woes make it more difficult to re-
energize the national economy. Current estimates suggest that state 
spending cuts and tax increases are " ... taking at least half a percentage 
point out of the growth of the economy," thus counteracting the national 
government's stimulus policy.88 
The Debate Over Causes or "Who is to Blame?" 
Crises invariably prompt finger pointing, and with the states' fiscal 
troubles going into a third year, the question of "who is to blame?" is being 
asked more and more frequently. The list of causes offered by academic 
analysts as well as partisan pundits is at once extensive and rather obvious 
(1) overspending by the states, (2) excessive tax cuts by the states, (3) 
structural problems in state revenue systems, ( 4) unfunded federal 
mandates, (5) declining federal aid to states and localities, (6) devolution 
of national program responsibilities to the states, (7) homeland security 
expenditures, (8) federal tax policy, (9) rising numbers of new immigrants, 
and (10) the sudden collapse of the "dot.com" bubble coupled with a broad 
and continuing decline in manufacturing.89 
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The length of this list reflects the complexities of American federal 
governance in which policies, politics, and finances are intertwined within 
a jurisdictional and organizational matrix composed of public and private 
elements, none of which are static. Although this list of causes is interesting, 
it is the debate over the various causes that is more important because the 
debate will likely influence policy choices in the near term. What makes 
this debate increasingly quarrelsome is that evidence exists to support each 
of the suggested causes. Unfortunately, there has been little effort to sort 
out the differential influence of a given cause. 
From a federalism perspective, there are additional contributing factors 
that should not be overlooked in any analysis of the current fiscal crisis of 
the American states. First, the institutional features of state governments 
shape policy outcomes. For example, almost every state has a balanced 
budget requirement, and thus must adjust its annual budget to the ebb and 
flow of revenues while simultaneously sustaining on-going obligations such 
as education, health care, infrastructure, and social services.9° Closing 
hospitals, prisons, and schools are not easy decisions that can be made 
quickly or without some planning devoted to phase-out issues. Second, 
although state legislatures possess final say on the state's budget, the 
management of some state policy areas is shared with independently elected 
state officials and local governments, thus complicating any rapid shift in 
policy. Third, interstate variation in budget instruments such as the item 
veto and its use as well as the existence of tax and/or expenditure limits 
(TELs) accounts for variation in state expenditures, both generally and by 
policy area.91 
The intergovernmental relationships among federal, state, and local 
governments create another set of factors influencing the fiscal crisis. The 
over 30-year old movement to devolve activities from Washington, D.C. to 
states and localities has contributed to an expansion of state responsibilities, 
even if part of the costs are subsidized by federal grants. Medicare, Medicaid, 
the Childrens' Health Insurance Program (CHIP), TANF, and the 2001 
NCLB are just a few examples of federal programs that have expanded state 
obligations. Second, the increasing reliance on the federal tax code as the 
preferred vehicle for achieving national policy objectives constrains the 
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states' ability to raise revenues. More frequent and more expansive changes 
in the federal tax code not only alter state tax bases, but also force states to 
change their tax codes more often, thus making budget planning more 
difficult especially in states with biennial budgets. Third, some observers 
argue the financial asymmetry between federal and state governments 
exacerbates the tendency of states to accept federal grants-in-aid as well as 
the strings attached, even though federal regulations are not necessarily 
welcomed by the states. Because federal aid makes it possible for states to 
pay for goods and services at a discounted rate when using grants with 
matching requirements, the effect of these grants is stimulative and additive. 
New activities and better activities are made possible by shared financing; 
homeland security provides a compelling example. Political pressure as 
well as democratic principles fuels the drive to provide minimum or 
adequate levels of many goods and services in all parts of the country. This 
in turn requires federal aid be designed to address resource inequalities 
among the states as well as the federal-state fiscal mismatch in ability to 
raise revenues. The financial asymmetry argument often ignores this shared 
financing that typifies U.S. intergovernmental relations. Fourth, in response 
to fiscal pressures on local government, most states have acted either to 
transfer a given function to state responsibility or to increase state aid to 
local units. A particularly expensive example is public education where 
state court decisions have required state governments to equalize per pupil 
funding across school districts. The fiscal disparity among school districts 
that state courts have acted to remedy also contributes to the push to obtain 
additional federal funding for local schools as well as the movement toward 
a minimum national performance level. 
Another combination of factors shaping the states' fiscal situation are 
changes in demographics and economics. A number of studies note that 
state spending has grown somewhat faster than the overall inflation rate, 
but many of these same studies fail to mention, as noted earlier, about half 
of state expenditure growth is a function of inflation and population growth. 
It is well known in public finance circles that population growth is a major 
driver of government spending, even if per capita spending is held constant 
(and public productivity does not change), an increase in population results 
either in more absolute spending or a service reduction. A particularly 
powerful example of demographic forces at work is the daily arrival of more 
immigrants. Second, in the last 20 years, state governments have 
experienced three recessions and two expansions. The current downturn 
is, as all acknowledge, the most serious in several decades, and so it should 
come as no surprise that states would encounter deficits. The larger issue is 
state government capacity to support and sustain long-term obligations in 
the face of economic volatility. The usual prescription is more economic 
growth, but states find themselves not just in competition with each other, 
but also in competition with other nations. Less obvious and more insidious 
is corporate tax sheltering that, according to the Multistate Tax Commission, 
resulted in a $12.4 billion loss to the states in 2001. Corporate profits paid 
to states have declined from 9 percent in the 1980s to under 6 percent 
today. R. Bruce Johnson, Utah's tax commissioner, described corporate 
tactics by noting: 
Some large, sophisticated companies are using sheltering devices, 
aggressive restructurings and other steps to avoid paying taxes at the state 
level. A third of these resources are dropping off the radar because 
aggressive companies are availing themselves of tax planning strategies 
that are not available to smaller companies or individuals, and the result 
is unfair to the vast majority of taxpayers.92 
Examples of states suffering the largest losses due to tax sheltering include 
West Virginia (58 percent), Ohio (56.9 percent), Florida (48.7 percent), 
and Mississippi ( 43.1 percent). 
Politics and partisan policy positions also contribute to the states' fiscal 
downturn. The Bush administration has adopted, rightly or wrongly, the 
policy that it is better for the federal government to stimulate economic 
growth by cutting taxes which it hypothesizes will generate rising revenues 
for all governments. By contrast, previous Republican administrations have 
supported strategies based on expenditures as exemplified by General 
Revenue Sharing during the Nixon era and the failed Reagan administration 
effort to "swap and turn back" certain responsibilities among the states and 
federal government. Second, interstate variation in the depth of the fiscal 
crisis is not solely the result of bad policy decisions or economic misfortunes, 
it is also a product of interstate variation in state political culture, including 
which interest groups dominate.93 The fundamental features of a state's 
politics determine whether state officials insist on a pay-as-you go approach 
or are willing to borrow heavily, whether Sunday sales of liquor will be 
permitted or gaming expanded, whether to engage in accounting gimmickry 
or to refrain from spending rainy-day funds. Third, partisan control of state 
government branches directly affects state spending growth. According to 
a recent study, state spending during the period 1997-2002 grew slower by 
almost a percentage point per year in those states characterized by divided 
government-i.e., the governorship and the legislature in the hands of 
different political parties-compared to those states where one party 
controlled both the governorship and the legislature. The highest rate of 
expenditure growth occurred when Republicans controlled the governorship 
and both houses of the state legislature, and the lowest rates occurred when 
a Democratic governor faced a Republican controlled legislature.94 
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Should Washington, D. C. Bail Out The States? 
For more than a year, the National Governors Association has called on 
the Bush administration and the Congress to provide some measure of relief 
to the states. These pleas have been made by governors representing both 
parties, but to no avail. President Bush, a former governor as are four 
members of his Cabinet, has not offered any financial assistance other than 
a modest $20 billion (half for Medicare, and half for other state needs). 
The aid package came only as part of a last-minute deal to lock up a few 
more Senate votes for Bush's 2003 tax cuts. 
Running parallel to the debate over "who is to blame" for the states' fiscal 
crisis is a highly charged debate over the merits of a federal bailout of the 
states. A report issued by the American Legislative Exchange Council declares 
that federal bailouts will not solve the states' fiscal problems.95 Michael Greve 
in a report issued by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research argues that "federal funding programs tend to expand state 
budgets" and that one solution would be to let states opt out of many current 
federally supported programs, including the newly minted NCLB.96 
For some, this opposition to a federal rescue of the states is a continuation 
of the Goldwater and Reagan campaigns to return programmatic and 
financial responsibility for social programs back to the states. This policy 
position holds that it is better for most domestic programs to be operated 
by the states because that makes the connection closer between those who 
pay for and those who benefit from a given service. In addition, returning 
programs to the states more likely guarantees that a program will reflect 
citizen preferences and state political culture. But for others, opposition 
to a federal bailout is part of a more generalized ideology of smaller 
government is better government. If state officials are forced to balance 
their budgets without federal aid, according to this view, they will have to 
make serious decisions as to which programs and which services their state 
is willing to fund. A Heritage Foundation report exemplifies this position: 
States, just like the federal government waste billions on mismanaged and 
unnecessary programs. Deficits provide states with a golden opportunity 
to examine their budgets and reduce wasteful and ineffective spending, 
which will help them keep taxes low and aid the economic recovery.97 
If it is important to shrink the size of the bureaucracy in Washington, it 
is also important to shrink state government bureaucracy. One way to 
accomplish this objective is to drive states to the edge of bankruptcy; 
therefore, the federal government should not rescue the states.98 "I hope a 
"'Richard Vedder, Should theFeds Bail Out the States? (Washington, DC: American Legislative Exchange 
Council, February 2003). 
96Greve, Wruhington and the States: Segregation Now. 
97Quoted in David Firestone, "Does Pain Make States Stronger?," Nro1 Yorl< Times, 27 April 2003 (Netscape 
version). 
98Bai, "Drip, Drip, Drip." 
state goes bankrupt," proclaimed Grover Norquist, a White House adviser, 
in what is no doubt the strongest statement of the anti-bailout position. 
Norquist explained his opinion by saying "I hope a state has real troubles 
getting its act together, so that the other 49 states can say, 'Let's not do 
that.' We need a state to be a bad example, so that others will start to make 
the serious decisions they need to get out of this mess."99 The advocates 
believe this strategy would ultimately produce a re-balancing of program 
responsibilities between the states and the federal government. 100 
Some see Bush's indifference to the plight of the states as a byproduct of 
the war against terrorism. Domestic priorities lose out to the struggle and 
the costs of containing Al-Qaeda and the war in Iraq. Richard Schrader, a 
prominent labor leader in New York, expressed this view by stating: "He's 
(Bush) wearing this wartime halo but someone needs to ask him [President 
Bush] why we can rebuild Baghdad but we can't rebuild Ground Zero and 
our cities and states." 101 Others see the refusal to aid the states as part of 
the long-standing tension between states and the federal government fueled 
by the increasing use of unfunded mandates in which the federal government 
pursues a policy objective by imposing it on the states without providing the 
necessary funds. 102 The 2001 NCLB is the most current and visible example. 103 
Finally, others view these arguments against a financial rescue of the states 
as part of a clever political ruse in which the Administration's push for 
reductions in federal taxes does not result in real tax cuts for citizens, but 
instead results in a shift of program costs to state and local governments. By 
devolving program and financial responsibility to the states, the effect will 
be to decentralize funding decisions. Instead of Congress raising taxes, it 
will be state legislatures, county boards, and city councils. 104 
Bruce Katz of the Brookings Institution notes that it is "odd and ahistorical 
to do nothing for the states and not expect it to hurt the national 
economy." 105 The federal government historically has stepped in to aid 
states and localities weather all manner of disasters and problems, including 
economic downturns, social disruption, and natural events. Further, 
domestic policy in the United States rests on a structure of programmatic, 
financial, and administrative responsibilities that have been shared by federal 
and state governments for much of the nation's history. 106 To abandon this 
shared responsibility during the "worst fiscal crisis" the states have faced in 
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decades would be an abrupt and highly unusual about-face in federal policy. 
Second, there are serious methodological questions about the evidence 
offered to make the case against a federal bailout. More than one of the 
analyses held up as illustrating the profligate nature of state government 
relies on simple current account figures and ignores inflation and 
population growth. The difference is important and striking. From FY1979 
to FY 2004, the nominal increase in state budgets was 6.2 percent, but the 
real increase was 2.2 percent. 107 Third, the call for additional federal aid to 
the states is bipartisan with governors and other elected officials from both 
parties publically supporting additional aid to the states. 108 For example, 
Governor Jeb Bush (R-FL) asked President Bush for more federal money 
to pay for the reforms in voting equipment and electoral procedures 
mandated by the Help America Vote Act (P.L.l07-20). 109 
However the debate is resolved, Washington's indifference to the fiscal 
crisis of the states constitutes a failure of leadership. Fundamental public 
services such as education, health care, infrastructure, and public safety 
cannot be left to the vagaries of the marketplace without seriously 
compromising the quality of those services as well as the ability to administer 
them in a cost-effective manner. John Kincaid pointedly notes that the 
federal government has a remedial responsibility to assist the states because 
the federal government" ... has loaded costs onto states via policy changes 
and conditions of aid for such programs as Medicaid, failed to fund 
mandates, declined to appropriate fair shares of funds for new policy 
initiatives, and preempted or curtailed states' authority to adjust their tax 
systems to contemporary economic realities." 110 It should be noted that Greve 
concurs with Kincaid on this indictment of federal action. As a remedy, 
Kincaid suggests the federal government use targeted aid and specific 
program reimbursements instead of a more general form of fiscal relief. 
One area of agreement within the debate over a federal bailout is the 
necessity of state governments to reform their own operations. Numerous 
experts have urged state officials to reform state tax systems to make them 
more congruent with the service based nature of the nation's economy as 
well as with the rapid growth of Internet based commerce. 111 Other 
recommendations include decoupling state personal income taxes from 
the federal code to minimize the effects of federal changes on state codes 
and modifying corporate tax credits and exemptions to make more 
predictable the year-to year reductions in corporate payments. Since the 
double-digit annual increases in Medicaid spending constitute the single 
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largest drain on state funds, states are being urged to rethink and make 
changes in the optional components of Medicaid services.U2 More states 
and localities ought to move toward performance-based management 
systems so that elected policymakers can more readily link budget decisions 
to effective activities. 
Finally, state officials do have an obligation to raise revenues when 
fundamental services are threatened. Dirk Kempthorne, the Republican 
governor of Idaho, succeeded in gaining support from the Republican-
dominated legislature for a temporary increase in the sales tax and a 
doubling of the cigarette tax. His justification exemplifies the balance 
between revenues and expenditures that must be maintained to provide 
adequate public services: 
I wasn'tgoing to make further cuts in education. I wasn'tgoing to release 
prisoners. I saw that in other states, and it was a disaster. We had proposals 
that would have eliminated the delivery of meals to elderly who had chosen 
to remain in their homes. If they don't receive that food, then they have 
no choice but to go into a nursing home. wny wouid you take their dignity 
away from them? ... I did what was unpopular, but in my mind and heart 
it was the right thing to do. And I think the measures that I've taken are 
being criticized by my brethren conservatives, well ... they're not standing 
in my shoes. 113 
Despite their previous opposition to tax increases, several other 
Republican governors raised taxes, including Alabama's Bill Riley, Arkansas' 
Mike Huckabee, Connecticut's John Rowland, Georgia's Sonny Perdue, 
Maryland's Bob Ehrlich, Nevada's Kenny Guinn, Ohio's Bob Taft, South 
Dakota's Mike Rounds, and Utah's Mike Leavitt. 114 In 2003, 17 states raised 
revenues by more than one percent of 2002 collections, and 4 of the 17 
raised revenues by more than 5 percent. Projected percentage change from 
FY 2003 to FY 2004 in state appropriations is only one percent compared to 
a 4.3 percent increase in state revenues. These adjustments are not likely to 
cure the fiscal crisis, but they do demonstrate that state officials are taking 
responsible steps to address the problem. Whether additional financial 
assistance will be forthcoming from Washington, D.C., remains to be seen. 
State Policy Actions 
Despite the bleak budget situation, states were not totally constrained 
from enacting important public policies, some of which run counter to 
policy positions favored in the nation's capital. This past year in response 
to judicial and public acceptance of DNA evidence, seven states (CO, CT, 
GA, MT, NV, NM, and OH) adopted laws facilitating the use of DNA testing; 
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at the same time, six states (AL, KS, MO, NE, WA, and TN) passed sentencing 
reforms that make early release easier for non-violent or low-risk, often first-
time offenders or divert them to alternative sentences. In the waning days 
of his term, Governor George Ryan of Illinois provoked a national dispute 
when he commuted 164 death sentences to life without parole, and he 
declared that Illinois' capital punishment system was "haunted by the demon 
of error." He also proclaimed the state legislature had failed to reform the 
process. A larger feud over death sentences erupted between several 
northern states (e.g., Illinois, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Vermont) 
plus Puerto Rico and U.S. Attorney GeneralJohnAshcroft. Previously,Janet 
Reno, Clinton's attorney general, permitted local prosecutors to decide when 
to ask for the death penalty, but the Justice Department under Ashcroft 
overruled a number oflocal prosecutors for failing to seek the death penalty 
in federal cases. Rhode Island abolished the death penalty in 1852, and 
Puerto Rico did so in its 1952 Constitution. Some claim that Ashcroft is 
trying to impose a southern conservative, traditionalist political culture on 
the rest of the nation, while others argue his Christian religious beliefs ignore 
the death-penalty positions of other faiths such as that of the Catholic 
Church, whose adherents populate Puerto Rico. Spokespersons for the 
Department of Justice claim their position is one of ensuring the death 
penalty is enforced "in a consistent and fair manner across the country." 
This federal-state feud will continue because juries in a number of states 
including more conservative ones such as Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia have refused to render the death penalty 
even when federal prosecutors have requested it. 115 
Other states passed laws restricting racial profiling, hate crimes, or non-
discrimination in employment. Several states also made it easier for 
immigrants to obtain driver's licenses or to pay in-state tuition to public 
universities. Workers gained new benefits or rights as some states adopted 
laws to foster gender comparable pay, increase the minimum wage, reduce 
disparities between public and private sector employees, or require public 
contractors to pay the prevailing wage. Other states enacted expansions of 
flexible sick leave, paid family leave, leave for domestic or sexual violence, 
and Governor Bill Richardson of New Mexico signed an executive order 
extending state employee benefits to gay and lesbian domestic partners. 116 
Over the last few years, New York, Rhode Island, Utah, and now Michigan 
have amended their constitutions to make them gender-neutral. 117 
States took actions to address the cost of prescription drugs as well as the 
Medicaid program's overall cost, the number of persons without health 
insurance, and the administration of state Medicaid programs. Nine states 
'"Froma Harrop, "Ashcroft unfairly forces states to embrace the death penalty," Creators Syndicate, 
reprinted in the Omaha WorU-Herald, 22July 2003 (Netscape version). 
116Progress in the States, Center for Policy Alternatives, july 2003 (ww.cfpa.org). 
"'Associated Press, "Some State Constitutions Going Gender-Neutral," N= York Times, 22 May 2003 
(Netscape version). 
plus the District of Columbia, using funds from The Heinz Family 
Foundation, developed plans to establish a pharmaceutical benefit 
management organization. This entity would be a nonprofit organization 
designed to handle contracts with pharmaceutical manufacturers to obtain 
for the states and the District the same discounts and rebates on prescription 
drugs manufacturers offer to private health-care providers. 118 
With state budget deficits growing, state Medicaid programs did not avoid 
cuts especially since 2002 state Medicaid expenditures exceeded available 
funds by about $2.8 billion. "The most prevalent type of cost containment 
in both fiscal 2002 and 2003 is controlling pharmaceutical costs followed 
by reductions or limits to provider payments."119 At the same time state 
Medicaid programs face reductions, some states broadened eligibility for 
the State Children's Health Insurance Program to parents of eligible 
youngsters. The justification for this expansion rests on the fact that offering 
health care to a child's parents increases the likelihood the child will receive 
health care. A number of states are also shifting "dual eligibles" to Medicaid 
coverage to free up Medicare dollars to pay for the growth in participants, 
while others have raised the income level to qualify for Medicaid. All of 
these actions made a modest dent in the number of uninsured. 120 
The states' battle with corporate malfeasance continued unabated. North 
Carolina, following New York's lead, established new conflict-of-interest 
standards for securities firms that provide services to the state. State public 
pension systems are in hot pursuit ofEnron officers, and the Ohio retirement 
system launched legal action against Global Crossing. TIAA-CREF, a 
retirement system for 2.4 million public workers, primarily university-based, 
announced plans to use its huge stock holdings to vote changes in corporate 
governance at shareholders meetings. 121 State attorneys general around 
the country (IL, MA, MN, NY, PA, TX) have taken numerous actions to 
regulate philanthropic organizations more closely. Of particular concern 
are issues such as lax oversight by charitable boards, inappropriate 
expenditures, improper contributions to political campaigns, nepotism, and 
outright theft of a charity's funds. 122 
Activism against corporations by state attorneys general prompted a group 
of state attorneys general in 1999 to form RAGA, the Republican Attorneys 
General Association, to stop "government lawsuit abuse." 123 RAGA now has 
20 members, and has allied itself with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and 
with the Law Enforcement Alliance of America, an organization tied to the 
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gun lobby. Although RAGA was formed to restrain anti-corporate lawsuits, 
it appears that its members, while "less likely to generate such cases 
themselves, nevertheless, ... have been happy to share in the wealth once a 
nationwide settlement agreement has been reached."124 Furthermore, RAGA 
has become increasingly active as a vehicle for electing more Republicans 
to the position of state attorney general. The growing entrepreneurial ism 
of state attorneys general not only has raised their political visibility and 
power but also has caused some observers of state politics to worry that 
attorneys general have begun to eclipse governors in importance. 
The California Recall 
The severity of the budget crisis in California, as might be expected for 
the nation's largest state, exceeds in breadth and depth that of any other 
state. Various estimates indicate that California state government went from 
a surplus of$237 billion to a deficit of$455 billion, and that the state "could 
have laid off every employee from governor to the last custodian for three 
full years and still have had a general-fund shortfall." 125 With almost every 
state mired in red ink, why has the situation in California resulted in a 
recall, when this has not occurred in other states? 
According to one of Gray Davis' political strategists, the recall is a product 
of "right-wing radio, right-wing groups, the whole right-wing nut axis that 
has been shut out of California politics for some time." 126 There is no doubt 
that partisan motivation played a role in the recall campaign as evidenced 
by the statements of Congressman Darrell Issa (R) who bankrolled the recall 
drive. Nor is there any doubt that policy missteps by the governor produced 
his very negative public opinion ratings. 
But is there something unique to California politics, and not just to the 
personality or political style of the governor, that contributed to the political 
crisis? First, the surprisingly quick speed at which the dot.com industry 
heavily concentrated in California collapsed makes it hard to imagine that 
any governor or legislature would have been able to respond rapidly enough 
to avoid serious consequences. Second, the energy deregulation crisis hurt 
the state's budget. A combination of factors-the nature of the plan enacted 
before Davis became governor, the Enron manipulations of the electricity 
market, the lack of assistance from the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, and Davis' own slowness in solving the problem-turned a 
potentially good policy into a fiasco. Third, and most important, the growing 
use of initiative politics cannot be overlooked as a major cause of the state's 
difficulties. Many state policies and their accompanying expenditures are 
the product of initiatives. In fact, "almost 44 percent of California's general 
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fund budget is expenditures mandated by voter-passed initiatives, these 
decisions were made by voters, not by Davis or any other elected politician. "127 
The effects of Proposition 13 (now 25 years old) and Proposition 218 in 
restricting local government revenue-raising has forced a centralization of 
taxing and spending. The constitutional requirement for a two-thirds vote 
in the legislature to raise taxes complicates efforts to find compromises 
acceptable across party lines. 
The ''Federal Weight" of California 
The electoral rules of America's federal system give considerable leverage 
in the U.S. House of Representatives and in the electoral college to the 
most populous states. No state in recent years has been able to exercise this 
leverage more influentially than has California. True, it is only one state, 
but California is home to one of eight Americans, exceeds the combined 
population of the 20 least-populated states, and is the world's fifth largest 
economy (larger than France). As a consequence, policy actions by 
California do not merely ripple through the rest of the nation; increasingly 
California policy choices counteract or even trump policies made in the 
national capital. Environmental protection policies as well as changes in 
automobile standards typically have a "made in California" stamp on them 
as "the size and strength of environmental interest groups in the state have 
made California the 'center of the environmental regulatory universe'." 128 
The list of policy areas in which California's preferred position contradicts 
federal policy is long and getting longer (e.g., energy policy, global warming, 
stem cell research, public pension system activism, identity theft, and 
computer privacy) .129 
No doubt some of the antipathy between Sacramento and Washington, 
D.C., is based in partisan differences: California state government is 
overwhelmingly Democratic, while the Republican party dominates in 
Washington. But this conflict also has roots in the types of interest groups 
that dominate state politics, not just the environmental groups already 
mentioned, but also the organizations representing various immigrant and 
minority populations. California's contradictory stance against numerous 
federal policies is also part of the larger surge in interstate activism and 
entrepreneurial behavior by state attorneys general. 130 
Some of the policy differences also arise from legitimate frustration in 
the states with the outcomes of the federal policy process. California is not 
the only state to react negatively to federal policy decisions that countermand 
state policies; Minnesota and Oregon are examples too. Globalization of 
the economy has impelled private enterprise to abandon its long association 
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with state officials and turn to federal officials to deregulate industry and to 
overturn stringent state regulations. 131 Joe Simitan, a California 
Assemblyman, expresses the interplay of economics with American 
federalism when he explains his authorship of a bill on database-breach 
disclosure: "I sympathize when the industry says it doesn't want 50 state 
standards ... But that's not an excuse for inaction. Many of the folks who 
testify in Sacramento for a single national standard are the same folks who 
testify in Washington for no standards at all."132 
It may be difficult to gauge, but antagonistic conflict between the states 
and the federal government seems to be on the rise. State government 
pursuit of policy options at odds with federal policy is, in Deil Wright's words, 
"likely to elevate the significance of conflict (tension) and suppress the 
level(s) of cooperation (tolerance) in the foreseeable future." 133 Wright 
suggests the "twin traumas of terrorism and finance" are the prime points 
of contention, but this focus is too narrow in that the contentiousness 
between states and the federal government, as Wright notes, has fluctuated 
over time. Certainly, the Bush administration's indifference to the states' 
fiscal crisis increases federal-state conflict, but the conflict has its roots in 
the larger economic, political, and cultural trends that shape how policies 
are formulated within the matrix of American federalism. Whether state-
federal tension is over gay marriages or school standards, global warming 
or economic deregulation, the conflicts are grounded in changes occurring 
in society that take different forms of expression as they percolate through 
the different components of the American federal system. 
FEDERALISM IN COURT134 
In contrast to the state-friendly federalism jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme 
Court since 1990,135 the Court's 2002-2003 term produced no new federalism 
decisions that advanced the post-1990 federalism trends. Although the states 
won many cases, and of cases brought by state attorneys general, the states 
won 13 and lost seven, the states lost the widely regarded bellwether 
federalism case, Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs. 136 In this 6-
3 ruling, the Court upheld, against an Eleventh-Amendment challenge, the 
right of state employees to sue their state in federal court to enforce rights 
under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993. This ruling was a 
surprising departure from the Court's recent Eleventh-Amendment rulings, 
and all the more so because Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote the 
majority opinion and Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor joined in the 
majority along with David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer. 
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Thus, two of the Court's "Federalism Five" voted against the states in Hibbs. 
The justices also upheld the federal Children's Internet Protection Act 
of 2001, which requires public libraries to install anti-pornography filters 
on all computers that provide library users with Internet access. An 
important factor in the Court's validating this act is that it is a condition 
attached to federal aid rather than a criminal statute. Two federal programs 
provide about $200 million per year for libraries to establish and link to 
electronic networks and to offer discount access to the Internet. "Congress 
has wide latitude to attach conditions to the receipt of federal assistance in 
order to further its policy objectives," opined Chief Justice Rehnquist. 137 
Otherwise, the Court held unanimously that local governments can be 
sued under the 1863 False Claims Act for defrauding the federal government, 
even though states cannot be sued under this statute.138 The justices upheld, 
however, a federal statute that makes documents produced by states in 
evaluating hazardous roads inadmissible in state or federal courts. The 
federal statute was a response to state concerns that a federal-aid requirement 
that they evaluate hazardous roads could generate documents that would 
attract lawsuits. The Washington Supreme Court had held that the federal 
statute exceeded Congress's enumerated interstate-commerce power. 139 
'In another case, which further limited state involvement in foreign affairs, 
the Court struck down a 1999 California law that required subsidiaries of 
European companies to disclose the names of millions of persons who had 
purchased insurance policies from their parent firms in Germany and other 
European countries between 1920 and 1945 so as to provide payments to 
Holocaust survivors on unpaid insurance policies. 14° Companies failing to 
make the disclosures would lose their license to practice in California. Justice 
Souter, who wrote the majority opinion in the 5-4 ruling, said that upholding 
the state law would "hamstring the President's settling international 
controversies." The U.S. government, opined Souter, has preferred to work 
with the International Commission on Holocaust-Era Insurance Claims to 
resolve claims through negotiation rather than litigation. However, more 
than 50 U.S. House members, led by Congressman Henry Waxman (D-
CA), have co-sponsored a bill to allow states to require publication of lists 
of policyholders. 
Although the Court also struck down a California law that retroactively 
eliminated statutes oflimitations on sex-related child-abuse crimes so as to 
allow prosecution of individuals long after the expiration of a previous statute 
of limitation,141 the justices generally supported tough law-and-order state 
policies. The Court upheld California's "three strikes and you're out" 
criminal-sentencing statute in two cases, one brought by a man who was 
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sentenced to 25 years in prison without parole for stealing three golf clubs 
from a shop and one by a man who was sentenced to two consecutive terms 
of 25 years to life for stealing $153.54 worth of videotapes from two Kmart 
stores. 142 The Court also rejected challenges to states' Megan's Laws, which 
require sex-offender registration and community notification. 143 The Court 
likewise ruled that limits placed on prisoner visitation by Michigan do not 
violate the right to association or the Constitution's cruel-and-unusual 
punishment clause as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment. 144 
The state prohibits, among other things, prison visits by former prisoners 
and children who do not belong to the inmate's immediate family. 
Additionally, visits can be denied for two years if an inmate is twice caught 
possessing illegal narcotics. 
In contrast, though, the justices held 8-0 that federal courts cannot close 
the door to a state prisoner who is appealing a state habeas corpus denial 
because he or she seems not to have a winnable case; instead, the inmate 
need only present a plausible case. 145 The decision opens the door 
considerably for federal appeals after many federal courts had virtually closed 
their doors in efforts to comply with the restrictive provisions of the 1996 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. With respect to indigent 
defendants, the Court upheld, against a Fifth Amendment takings challenge, 
Washington's "interest on lawyers' trust accounts" (IOLATA) program, which 
uses such interest to help pay for legal services for the poor. 146 
In Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, 147 the justices ruled 9-0 that 
Nevada courts did not have to extend full faith and credit to a California 
law that gives California's tax assessors and Franchise Tax Board absolute 
immunity for any tort suits arising from a tax assessment. The case involved 
a California resident who claimed that he moved to Nevada, a state with no 
income tax, shortly after he earned $20 million on a patent. The former 
resident sued California in Nevada courts under Nevada law for intentional 
torts committed mostly in California. California was supported by 20 states 
and by many state and local associations which argued that a ruling against 
California would undermine legitimate tax-collection efforts and encourage 
wealth to flee to tax-haven states. The Court ruled in a commerce case that 
lawsuits alleging that interest rates charged by national banks are illegally 
excessive must be heard in federal rather than state courts because the 
National Bank Act preempts state usury laws. 148 
In important policy cases favoring the states, however, the Court limited 
the reach of the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
142 Ewing\'. Califumia, 538 U.S. II (2003) and Lockyerv. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 
'" Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. John Doe, 538 U.S. I (2003) and Delbert W Smith and Bruce M. 
Botelho v. john Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
'" Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. I26 (2003). 
'" Miller·Eiv. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003). 
"
6 Allen D. Brown and Greg Hayesv. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (2003). 
147 538 U.S. 488, I23 S.Ct. 1683 (2003). 
'" Bentjicial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 L'.S. I (2003). 
by upholding Kentucky's "any willing provider" law, which allows any health-
care provider to join an insurance network so long as the provider accepts 
the insurer's rules and payment levels. 149 The insurance industry contended 
that ERISA preempted Kentucky's statute. This important decision helps 
clarify the scope and conditions of ERISA's preemption of state authority 
to regulate health care and to facilitate greater access to private-sector health 
insurance. In turn, the Court lifted an injunction that had blocked 
implementation the Maine Rx Program since its 2000 enactment.150 The 
program, directed at the state's uninsured residents, seeks to obtain 
discounts on prescription drugs for them. Maine was supported by an amicus 
brief filed by 29 states. 
Highly publicized were the Court's decisions to uphold an affirmative-
action admissions program operated by the University of Michigan law 
schooP 51 while, at the same time, striking down the university's 
undergraduate admissions system that awarded 20 extra points on a 150-
point scale to black, Hispanic, and Indian applicants. 152 The Court did not, 
however, require states to adopt affirmative action; thus, the decisions did 
not overturn California's Proposition 209 on race-neutral admissions to state 
colleges and universities. 
In another controversial ruling, the Court opined that a state can outlaw 
cross burning when such cross burning is intended to intimate people but 
that, otherwise, merely burning a cross does not prove intent to intimate 
others. 153 Hence, a state cannot outlaw cross burning per se. 
The Court, however, upheld a New York human-rights law that allows 
homeowners to prohibit solicitations by real-estate agents for sale of their 
home. 154 The law's intent is to prevent "block-busting," the practice of 
soliciting home listings and sales by suggesting that a block or area is 
undergoing racial, ethnic, or religious change. At the same time, the Court 
protected the city of Cuyahoga Falls, an Akron suburb, against a $3 million 
lawsuit that accused the city of holding a racially motivated housing 
referendum in 1996 in order to block racial integration.155 Under a provision 
of the city's charter, residents had demanded a referendum on an ordinance 
permitting construction of a low-income housing project. Voters defeated 
the ordinance in the referendum. Although the Ohio Supreme Court struck 
down the referendum, plaintiffs sued the city for violating the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by holding the referendum 
and delaying construction of the housing. During oral arguments, justice 
Antonin Scalia asked, "How can you have a wrong referendum?" Justice 
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O'Connor said that if the lawsuit was not vacated, governments across the 
country could be sued for putting "nutty proposals" before the voters. 
Also highly publicized was the Court's 5-4 ruling overturning on broad 
privacy grounds a Texas law that criminalized same-sex sodomy,l56 thus 
voiding the sodomy laws still extant in 13 states in 2003 and also overturning 
Bowersv. Hardwick (1986). 157 The Court also held that states can use Social 
Security and other benefits to reimburse foster parents for purchasing such 
things as food and clothing. 158 
Finally, and pertinent to partisan polarization today, the Court said that 
in redistricting, states can consider a minority group's general influence on 
the electoral process rather than only the number of minority voters in a 
district. 159 The decision was a victory for Democrats who had sought to 
spread black voters across more districts so as to produce more victories for 
Democratic candidates rather than packing African-Americans into majority-
minority districts where they produce fewer Democratic victories. 
Republicans and the U.S. Department of Justice contended that any 
reduction in the percentage of minority voters in such a district is an 
unconstitutional "retrogression" or dilution of minority voting rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The unusual partisan unity displayed on the steps of the national Capitol in 
September 2001 disappeared in less than a year and more typical policy 
disagreements returned with a vengeance. Even the extension of the war 
on terrorism to a second country did not restrain conflict, rather it fueled 
it. Enmity between the parties quickly reappeared in the mid-term election 
fights as Democrats accused the White House of using the threat of Iraq's 
weapons as part of a "wag the dog" strategy to divert public attention from 
more pressing economic ills. However, the more serious and often more 
intense opposition to presidential initiatives came from within Republican 
ranks. For example, factions within the Republican majorities in both 
congressional chambers forced significant changes in the third round of 
tax cuts. Bush also encountered frustrations within his own party over other 
important policies such as his faith-based initiatives, Medicare reform, and 
TANF reauthorization. Instead of the unity one might expect because the 
majority party possessed only a slim edge in seats in each chamber, one 
found factionalism. Instead of unity prompted by shared wartime goals, 
one found rising levels of interparty acrimony. 
One source of these conflicts rested on predictable state and regional 
interests; for example, rural members of Congress worried over the absence 
of private health-care providers in their areas, while congressional delegates 
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from metropolitan areas complained loudly about the lack of sufficient funds 
for homeland security. A second source of conflict can be traced to the 
excessive partisanship of national politics and the growing unwillingness to 
compromise. The debates over Medicare reform, for example, pitted 
supporters of the Great Society public approach to health care against 
proponents of a market-based approach-a confrontation not easily 
amenable to compromise. A third and more subtle source of conflict can 
be found in a declining commitment by both political parties to a consistent 
stance on federalism principles. Whereas in the past one could expect 
Republicans to defend states' rights and Democrats to advocate federal 
action, these positions have become quite inconsistent. 160 The No Child 
Left Behind Act of2001, labeled by President Bush as "the cornerstone" of 
his domestic policy, exemplifies this inconsistency on federalism principles. 
Not since the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 has the 
federal government imposed such a sweeping set of new policies on public 
education, but this time "the party oflocal control had become the party of 
federal mandate." 161 Part of this seeming reversal on federalism principles 
is tied to regional and group interests influential in each party. Some of 
the reversal also results from demographic changes in each party. Whatever 
the combination of causes, this emerging alteration of each party's position 
on the roles of national and state governments undercuts long-standing 
policy positions and mobilizes policy supporters to oppose the change. As 
principles and policies become untied from traditional moorings, the level 
of conflict within and between parties increases. This important trend in 
American federalism will have to be followed closely because all signs point 
to its continuation. 
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